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Article 9

LEX SATIS IUSTA
Jeremy Waldron*
I.
"Lex iniusta non est lex." John Finnis reminds us, at the end of
Natural Law and NaturalRights,' that the central tradition of natural
law theory did not formulate its thesis about the relation between law
and justice by saying things like "an unjust edict cannot be law" or "a
morally iniquitous command cannot be law." Instead, says Finnis, "the
tradition... has affirmed that unjust LAWS are not law." 2 He offers
several elaborate explanations-and, I should say at once, they are
helpful and convincing explanations-of why this paradox is not a
contradiction. His explanations appeal to the distinction between
normative, descriptive, and detached uses of terms such as "law," as
well as to the further distinction, central to Finnis'sjurisprudence, between the focal meaning and the secondary meanings of such terms.3
Finnis explains the point as follows: to say that some norm which
is unjust is not law is to use "law" in a non-detached, first-person, normative or practical way. It is to use the term in a way which (if it were
not negated) would assert and engage-for purposes of action as well
as reflection-all of the reasons and all of the normative consequences which flow from something being law, so far as its place in
practical reasonableness is concerned. So the statement denies that
the standard in question is "law" in that normatively central or, as Finnis calls it, "focal ' 4 sense.
* Maurice and Hilda Friedman Professor of Law, and Director of the Center for
Law and Philosophy, Columbia University; BA. 1974, LL.B. 1978, University of Otago,
New Zealand; D.Phil. 1986, University of Oxford. Thanks are due to Jules Coleman,
John Finnis, Robert George, Kent Greenawalt, Jody Krauss, Stephen Perry, Joseph
Raz, Scott Shapiro, and Ben Zipursky, for comments on earlier versions of this Essay.
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To insist that the norm is nevertheless law in some sense, despite
being unjust and thus despite not being law in the sense just outlined,
is to do one or both of two other things. It is to use the term "law"
normatively, but in a secondary sense-a sense in which the reasons
and consequences for action and reflection are asserted and engaged
hesitantly, ambivalently, or only in part. (For example, it may be to
say that the unjust thing commands a modicum of law-like respect, but
only by virtue of its connection with the legal system of which it is a
part, rather than by virtue of that connection plus the contribution of
its particular content to the common good.) Or it is to use "law" in a
non-normative and non-practical sense-for example, in a way that
conveys information about what is in fact accepted as having the normative consequences of "law" in a given community, or about what
follows from the application of certain rules, like secondary rules,
which are constitutive of a given legal system, to the thing in question.
In short, to say that an unjust law is not law is to say that something which is sort of law, or which is (sort of) accepted as law, is not
really law (in a sense of "law" that really counts) on account of its
injustice.
II.
Is natural law theory committed to saying something like that
about every law which is unjust? Or, may natural law jurisprudence
acknowledge that some unjust laws are-in spite of their injusticelaws in the fullest sense (using "law" in the focal, non-detached, firstperson, practical, and normative sense, not just in the hesitant, detached, or descriptive senses)?
Finnis, I think, believes the answer is "no." (I shall explain why in
a moment, though again I want to emphasize immediately that what
he says is much more careful and qualified than what is said by most
people addressing the lex iniusta doctrine. 5 ) I suspect he is wrong
about this. The aim of this Essay is to explicate the possibility I have
just outlined-that natural law jurisprudence should acknowledge
that some unjust laws are laws in the fullest sense in spite of their
injustice.
Let me anticipate a little, so readers will know what moves to look
out for. My argument will be based on the significance of disagreement
aboutjustice as one of the circumstances in which law characteristically
makes its claims to human attention and respect. I shall argue that
the existence of disagreement about justice is as central to the notion
5

See infra Part III.
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of law as the existence of moderate scarcity is to the concept of distributive justice. 6 Though distributive justice is a critical ideal, the viewpoint from which (ideally) criticisms and evaluations are made in the
name of distributive justice is not a viewpoint that excludes scarcity.
And similarly, I want to say that although law is also a critical ideal, the
viewpoint from which (ideally) criticisms and evaluations are made in
the name of law is not a viewpoint from which disagreement about
justice is excluded. Since people are likely to disagree about the justice of any norm that is proposed as law, and since a norm's validity as
law for a community, even on a natural law criterion of validity, must
be something that the members of the community in question can
share a view on, it must be possible for someone to say wholeheartedly, "this norm, which I think is less just than an alternative available
to us, is nevertheless law for us, in the fullest sense in which law answers to the requirements of human and social good."
Now, no one owns the rights to "natural law theory," and my
point could be made cheaply by finding some obscure body of jurisprudence that could, at a pinch, be labeled "natural law theory" and
which had the consequence I am interested in exploring. A shrewd
positivist might even claim that his legal positivism is true natural law
theory, and from that, he might claim natural law credentials for the
positivist thesis that at least some unjust laws are nevertheless laws in
the fullest sense of the term. Thomas Hobbes comes close to this in
his argument in Leviathan that "[t]he Law of Nature, and the Civil
Law, contain each other, and are of equall extent," 7 and in his
broader insistence that natural law, properly understood, requires one
to refrain from inferring any doubts about the lawfulness of a sovereign's command from one's beliefs about its injustice (or indeed to
refrain from forming any independentjudgment of its justice or injustice at all).8 I shall return to Hobbes later in the Essay. But my intention is to develop this hunch at the center of natural law theory, rather
than on its margins. As we shall see, Finnis's own argument provides
as good a place as any to begin.

6 See infra Part XI.
7 THOMAS HOBBES, LEviAT.A 185 (Richard Tuck ed., rev. student ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1996) (1651).
8 See, e.g., THOMAS HOBBES, ON THE CIrIZEN 8-9 (Richard Tuck & Michael
Silverthorne eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1998) (1642) (denouncing as an erroneous
doctrine the view that a sovereign's commands "may rightly be discussed before they
are carried out, and in fact ought to be discussed").
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III.
Let me say first why I believe that Finnis denies the proposition I
want to consider, namely, that an unjust law may nevertheless be law
in the fullest sense. The matter has to do with the demandingness of
what Finnis takes to be the viewpoint from which (that is, the basis on
which) the focal meaning of the term "law" is appropriately distinguished from its secondary meanings. Such a viewpoint is not simply
that of a participant in the legal system-as it is, for example, in
H.L.A. Hart's jurisprudence, where "law" and "legal system" are understood from the viewpoint of a member of the corps of specialist
legal officials. 9 It must be at least the viewpoint of a participant who
takes law seriously, who regards its demands as requirements of practical reasonableness, and who thinks it a matter of overriding importance that law, as distinct from other forms of social order, should
come into being and be sustained as the mode of governance for
human communities. 10
Among those who take that viewpoint, there will be some whose
views about practical reasonableness are more reasonable than others.
Theirs, Finnis insists, is the viewpoint that we should place at the absolute center of our focal conception of law:
[T] he central case viewpoint itself is the viewpoint of those who not
only appeal to practical reasonableness but also are practically reasonable, that is to say: consistent; attentive to all aspects of human
opportunity and flourishing, and aware of their limited commensurability; concerned to remedy deficiencies and breakdowns, and
aware of their roots in the various aspects of human personality and
in the economic and other material conditions of social interaction.
What reason could the descriptive theorist have for rejecting the
conceptual choices and discriminations of these persons, when he is
selecting the concepts with which he will construct his description
of the central case ...of law as a specific social institution? 1 '
It follows, says Finnis, that the legal theorist cannot identify the
central case of this viewpoint unless he puts himself in the shoes of
these persons-that is, unless he is prepared to ask himself "what the
requirements of practical reasonableness really are, in relation to this
12
whole aspect of human affairs and concerns."

9

10
11
12
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LAW 100-23 (2d ed. 1994).

See Fnmis, supra note 1, at 14-15.
Id. at 15 (emphasis and footnotes omitted).
Id. at 16.
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Prominent among the demands of practical reasonableness isjustice.' 3 Like other aspects of practical reasonableness, justice is something one can get right or one can get wrong. It follows, from what
was said in the last paragraph, that the viewpoint from which the focal
meaning of law is distinguished from its secondary meanings is the
viewpoint of a person who holds reasonable views about justice-that
is, a person who is not likely to think just (or present as just) what is in
fact unjust. Of course,justice is not all there is to that viewpoint. Still,
the central case of law and the focal meaning of the term "law" cannot.
possibly be understood with reference to an unjust (or, as to justice,
misconceived) understanding of practical reasonableness. The viewpoint of any such understanding must be regarded as at least somewhat
lesser or secondary, relative to a viewpoint constituted by an understanding that is not unjust or misconceived about justice in this way.
From this, it would seem to follow that an unjust law cannot possibly be regarded as law, in the focal sense of "law." To think that it was
a focal case of law would be either to judge it from a viewpoint that
involved a misapprehension aboutjustice or a misapprehension about
the importance of justice so far as the relation between law and the
demands of practical reasonableness were concerned, or to make
some sort of mistake in the application of a viewpoint that did involve
an adequate grasp of these matters.
By the same token, to think that a law is unjust is (on Finnis's
account) necessarily to think of it as law only in a lesser or secondary
sense. Even if one is wrong in thinking it unjust, what one is thinking
is something which entails that the law in question is not in the fullest
sense law. In other words, there does not seem to be any looseness in
Finnis's system in the implication from (a) the judgment that something is law in the fullest sense to (b) thejudgment that it isjust. Any
doubt about (b) is eo ipso a doubt about (a), since the viewpoint from
which the central case of law and the focal meaning of the term "law"
are understood is a viewpoint defined, inter alia, as the best possible
view aboutjustice. To raise a doubt about the justice of a law entails
raising a doubt about whether it satisfies that viewpoint. And similarly, to disagree with a fellow citizen about the justice of a law is to
disagree about whether it can be regarded as law in the fullest sense.
As far as I can tell, all this follows from the natural law position as
Finnis presents it. Finnis does not of course infer any easy entitlement
to disregard or disobey a law simply because it has been shown to be
unjust.' 4 But it does seem to be Finnis's position that whatever follows
13
14

See id at 181.
See id. at 354.
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about respect and compliance from the fact that something is the law,
follows more equivocally and with greater hesitation in a case in which
the law in question is unjust.
IV.
There is, however, material in Finnis's conception that might
form the basis for a different view. Consider the account he gives of
the need for authority in chapter nine of Natural Law and Natural
Rights.'5 Authority, Finnis argues, is needed in human communities
not only on account of people's weakness or wickedness. It would also
be needed, even among a people of great intelligence and dedication,
so far as the demands of practical reasonableness and the common
good are concerned. 16 A person dedicated to the common good
will always be looking out for new and better ways of attaining the
common good, of co-ordinating the action of members, of playing
his own role. And the intelligent member will find such new and
better ways, and perhaps not just one but many possible and reasonable ways. Intelligence and dedication, skill and commitment thus
multiply the problems of co-ordination, by giving the group more
possible orientations, commitments, projects, "priorities," and procedures to choose from. And until a particular choice is made,
17
nothing will in fact be done.
So we face what Finnis calls "co-ordination problems"-problems to
which there are "two or more available, reasonable, and appropriate

solutions, none of which, however, would amount to a solution unless
adopted to the exclusion of the other solutions available, reasonable,

and appropriate for that problem."' 8 The function of authority is to
resolve such problems, to enable the intelligent and imaginative creatures we are to focus our cooperation, in relation to each set of competing alternatives, on just one of the schemes that offer us ways of
promoting the common good.
Here is an example. (It is mine, not Finnis's.) Human communities face questions about how to deal with natural disasters such as
floods and earthquakes. Various proposals might be made about how
the community should prepare itself for these eventualities. Someone
may propose a scheme (C) in which every citizen undertakes some
fairly intense basic training in civil defense; someone else may propose an alternative scheme (C 2) in which a specialist civil defense
15 See id. at 231-59.
16 See id. at 231.
17 Id. at 231-32.
18 Id. at 232.
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corps is set up and trained (among other things) in the art of mobilizing a largely untrained population in the event of disaster. For the
sake of preparedness, a community vulnerable to catastrophe must
settle on one of these schemes. Let's say that the magnitude of the
disasters it may face is such that either all civilians have to have basic
training in civil defense, or some corps of specialists has to be trained
in mobilizing an untrained citizenry. The community needs some way
of designating either C or C2 as the scheme in which its energies will
be invested so far as preparedness is concerned, and the citizens must
know which of the schemes has been selected so they know what they
are to do, both in advance and in the eventuality of a disaster. (They
must know which script has been chosen before they can play their
role.) Fortunately, the community has a mechanism for settling
problems of this sort, its members have elected a leader to solve coordination problems by selecting among the available alternatives in
cases like these and designating just one of them as the community solution. The leader turns his attention to the matter and designates C1.
The decision is promulgated, C1 is instituted, and everyone plays the
part C1 assigns him. As a result, when an earthquake strikes two or
three years later, the community is about as prepared on the civil defense front as it could reasonably have been expected to be.
The example illustrates a couple of things, both of them implicit,
I think, in the account of authority and coordination that Finnis provides. First, a trivial point: I take it we all agree that although authority
is an ideal-type conceptl 9-that is, the term is used normatively and
evaluatively--it has a "focal meaning," there are central and secondary
cases of authority, etc. It is not shifted from its central ground in this
case by the fact that it is being used to address a regrettable and lessthan-ideal circumstance that faces human communities-namely, natural disasters. Such a regrettable and less-than-ideal circumstance is
exactly the sort of circumstance in which authority does its central and
ideal work.
Second, we should also not regard it as a derogation from the
centrality of this case that the members of the community have come
up with more than one scheme, competing (as it were) to fill this
single slot of community-preparedness. On the contrary, what could
be better in a civic-minded community than that people propose a
variety of bright ideas to address problems like civil defense preparedness? Anyway, we simply cannot say that the multiplicity of schemes
compromises the centrality of this instance of authority. For the mul19

For a discussion of "ideal-type" concept, see id. at 9.
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tiplicity of schemes is exactly what poses the problem that calls for
authority in the first place.
V.
Now consider a third point, which Finnis's formulation does not
bring out nearly so well. When C2 is proposed, it is unlikely to be
proposed simply as another way of doing what C1 proposes to do. Instead, we should imagine that those who propose C2 do so because
they think it is a better way of addressing the preparedness problem.
Or more abstractly, they think that C2 better embodies the demands
of practical reasonableness (prudent coordination in regard to this
aspect of the common good) than C1. That is why they propose it.
They are not necessarily right about this, of course. Certainly,
they are not rightjust because they think they are. But I am interested
in what follows from the content of their thought, particularly so far as
the exercise of authority in the community is concerned. Let's call
the particular exercise of authority (choosing C1 over C2) "E." The
proponents of C2 believe,
(1) C2 embodies the demands of practical reasonableness better

than C1.
And they know that:
(2) By exercise of authority E, C1 has been selected over C2.
At the end of Part IV, I said in effect,
(3) In these circumstances, E is a central, not a secondary or marginal, instance of the exercise of authority.
And I thought I was following Finnis in this. That is, I thought this
was exactly the sort of case in which Finnis would think the concept of
authority was fully and centrally engaged.
But is 3 something the proponents of C2 can believe? Is 3 compatible with 1 and 2? Surely not, according to the reasoning I attributed to Finnis earlier in Part III. For if it is true that the focal
meaning of "law" (and the centrality of certain cases of law) cannot
possibly be grasped with reference to a wrong or misconceived understanding of practical reasonableness, the same must surely be true of
the focal meaning of "authority" and central cases of authority. They,
too, are best grasped from a viewpoint that is not mistaken about practical reasonableness. So, if proposition 1 is true, then authority-exercise E cannot be regarded as a central case; any claim to regard it as
such would have to involve either an inadequate viewpoint so far as
practical reasonableness was concerned or, in the case of an adequate
viewpoint, a mistake in its application to E. I am not saying that this is
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true (that favoring E does involve a mistake or an inadequate viewpoint), but I am saying that this follows from what the proponents of
C2 think. I am saying it follows from the content of their thought as
expressed in 1. Or, to put it the other way around, since 2 is undeniable, it looks as though the proponents of C2 can accept 3 only by giving up 1.
This is not just a problem from the point of view of the proponents of C2. It is also a problem for their rivals and for the whole
community. What began as a disagreement over the desirability of C2
over C1 has become a dispute about whether E is a central, as opposed
to a marginal, instance of the exercise of authority. And that logic
seems subversive of the point of authority. For surely--and certainly
on Finnis's account-it is the central function of authority, in cases
like this, to settle on one or the other of the competing schemes in
the name of the whole community despite the community-members'
disagreements about their merits.
VI.
Finnis may be tempted to say that those who believe 1 cannot
believe that E is a central instance of authority, because the central
case of authority has to do with the choice between "two or more available, reasonable,and apprcpriatesolutions." 20 He may think that their
acceptance of I shows that they think that C1 is unreasonable and inappropriate, at least compared to C2. That is, Finnis may be tempted
to identify the central case of authority with effective selection in the
name of the community among equally eligible alternatives. He may be
tempted to say that selection among alternatives, one of which is eligible and the other not, either is not a central case of authority or is a
central case of authority only on the condition that the eligible alternative is chosen. And he may use this to explain why those who accept
1 should, therefore, deny 3. I believe, however, that this temptation
should be resisted.
Unless it is resisted, the focal meaning of authority will be associated with a class of cases in which its tasks seem least consequential-a
class of cases that game-theorists call pure coordination games. In a
pure coordination game, the matrix of possibilities for two persons
looks like Figure 1.

20

Id. at 232 (emphasis added).
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Column-Chooser

Row-Chooser

FIGURE 1:

do X

do Y

doX

1,1

2,2

doY

2,2

,1

PuRE COORDINATION

In each cell (for each outcome), the value of the outcome in RowChooser's eyes is stated first, and the value of the outcome in ColumnChooser's eyes is stated second. The pay-offs are valued ordinally in
each case and for each player as follows: (1, 2) means that the outcome is the best of the possible outcomes in Row-Chooser's eyes and
the second-best of the possible outcomes in Column-Chooser's eyes.
"Drive on the left" and "drive on the right" are possible instances
of X and Y that satisfy this scheme for any pair of choosers who share
the same roads, and it illustrates appropriately enough the gravity of
the problems to which this sort of conception applies. Neither party
thinks X or Y a better solution. Each would be entirely content with
either, provided the other party adopted it also. And each knows this
about the other. It is clear enough that a community needs authority
to solve problems like this. But it is clear, too, that the cases which
satisfy these specifications are miles away from the central and serious
21
cases in which authority is required in human life.
It seems characteristic of serious cases of the exercise of authority
that it is exercised in order to select among options which the persons
over whom the authority is exercised do not regard as equally eligible.
As I said earlier, the fact that they do not regard them as equally eligible is probably indispensable in explaining the genesis of the alternatives. The alternatives do not appear by magic or out of nowhere
(nor, as in the simple driving case, are they more or less given by the
situation). They are proposed as an upshot of the exercise of human
intelligence. Moreover, they are proposed, not as playful alternatives-"What say we try this?"-but as suggested improvements. One
cannot propose something as an improvement and then be indifferent as between its adoption and the adoption of the alternative on
which it is supposed to improve. That is what is going on in our civil
21 Also, as one of Finnis's critics has pointed out, the more Finnis concentrates on
cases exactly like this, the more difficult a task he has in moving from the central case
of authority (so understood) to what he would regard as the central case of law. See
Leslie Green, Law, Co-Ordination,and the Common Good, 3 OxFoRDJ. LEGAL STUD. 299,

299-324 (1983).
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defense example-the choice between C and C2. People came up
with C2 because they thought it would be better.
In cases like this, then, what becomes of Finnis's stipulation that
authority is a response to problems in which there are "two or more
available, reasonable, and appropriate solutions, none of which, however, would amount to a solution unless adopted to the exclusion of
the other solutions available, reasonable, and appropriate for that
problem?" 2 2 The answer is that we can interpret "reasonable and appropriate" in a way that does not amount to "indistinguishable as to
reasonableness and appropriateness." We do so in the following matrix Figure 2.
Column-Chooser

Row-Chooser

FIGuRE

2:

C,

C2

CI

1,2

3,4

C2

4,3

2,1

PARTIAL CoNmFLIr

(The values here are as they were before: ordinal as to the common
good and representing the opinion of each party, with Row-Chooser's
evaluation stated first. As before, the values represent the parties'
judgments of desirability so far as the common good is concerned.)
Though Column-Chooser regards C2 as better than C1, he nevertheless thinks C1 is a reasonable and appropriate solution for the parties to coordinate upon, at least compared to the value of noncoordination. That is, he thinks outcome (C1, C) would be better for
the community than (C, C2). Clearly, a community facing this sort of
choice requires authority to choose among outcomes which are reasonable (in this sense), in order to avoid the occurrence of the third
or fourth-ranked outcomes-( C, C2) and ( C2, C)-that would result
from non-coordination. Though the parties value the different
schemes and the different outcomes differently--by which I mean
they value them differently in terms of the common good-they agree
that it would be disastrous for each to attempt to play his part in his
favorite scheme without regard to the part that the other was playing.
To avoid this disaster, each needs to share knowledge with the others
about what scheme will be regarded by others as the salient point of
coordination, and they need collective assurance that that is the
22

Fn,lNs, supra note 1, at 232.
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scheme in which the others will play their part. That knowledge and
that assurance are what authority can provide. And it seems to me
that providing such knowledge and assurance in precisely these circumstances-circumstances where people disagree about the merits
of what is proposed-is a central case, not a secondary or marginal
case, of the contribution that authority can make to the pursuit of
common good in human communities.
VII.
What, then, would it be for a proposal to be thought unreasonable in this context? Well, consider a pair of proposals, C, and C2, evaluated by the parties as follows in Figure 3.
Column-Chooser

Row-Chooser

FIGURE

3:

C1

C2

C1

1,

32

C2

4,2

2,1

NoN-COORDINATION

In this case, Column-Chooser regards coordination on C as
worse than no coordination at all. Like someone who would rather
not go with others to a restaurant if they have to go to an English
restaurant or who would rather that there was not a single Republican
presidential candidate if it were going to be someone like Newt Gingrich, Column-Chooser judges that the desirability of a coordinative
outcome is not unlimited. Row-Chooser denies this, of course. According to him, the situation is pretty much like the choice in Figure
2: (C, CI) is better than either of the non-coordinative outcomes. But
Row-Chooser may be wrong about this and Column-Chooser right, for
it is a fact that not every coordinative scheme proposed for the sake of
the common good is better, from the point of view of practical reasonableness, than no coordination at all. So Figure 3 provides an interpretation of what it is for someone to judge a coordinative proposal
unreasonable (and also what it is for someone else to deny this).
The matrices I have given so far reflect nothing but the judgments of the parties-their individual beliefs or convictions about the
contribution that possible outcomes would make to the common
good. But this format is not intended to suggest that there is no fact
of the matter. We could concoct a set of matrices just like Figures 1-3,
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except that they are designed to express what we might think of as the
objective value of the various schemes:
CI
C

C

C,

C2

C,

2

3

C2

3

1

C2

1

2

C,

C2

C,

3

2

C2

2

1

first matrix:

second matrix:

third matrix:

pure coordination

partial conflict

non-coordination

FIGuRE

4:

OBJECTrIVE VALUES

In the second matrix of Figure 4, option C is portrayed as objectively reasonable, despite its objective inferiority to C2. Its reasonableness consists in its being objectively preferable to either of the noncoordinative outcomes. In the third matrix of Figure 4, option C1 is
portrayed as objectively unreasonable as a point of coordination, despite its being thought reasonable by one of the parties, whose evaluations are presented in Figure 3. The distinction between reasonable
and unreasonable options, portrayed here, is quite independent of
what anyone thinks. 23 The sense in which C1 is a reasonable option in
the second matrix of Figure 4 has nothing to do with anyone's thinking that it is superior to C2 (though no doubt it is the case that there
would not be a C1 to consider unless someone thought it superior).
Its reasonableness consists simply in its objective superiority to either
24
of the non-coordinative outcomes.
VIII.

It has been a while since we said anything aboutjustice. It may be
thought that the analysis I have given is all very well when we are
choosing between things like alternative schemes for civil defense (C1
and C2), where an option can be described as reasonable, even
though it is believed to be inferior. But is it acceptable to think along
these lines when the issue is justice?
Finnis's own presentation of the coordination idea seems to suggest that the answer is "yes" (though in Part XII, below, I shall consider some suggestions he has made in more recent work that there
23 It is purely a matter of whether authority (a device which, on Finnis's account,
can do nothing for the common good which does not involve facilitating coordination) makes things better or worse than they would be without coordination.
24 I think Finnis is referring to something like this when he talks about the use of
authority "to promote schemes thoroughly opposed to practical reasonableness" as a
deviant use of authority. FrNms, supra note 1, at 246.
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cannot be reasonable disagreements about the fundamentals of justice). The passage which I quoted from Natural Law and Natural
Rights at the beginning of Part IV 25 observed that intelligent individuals are likely to come up with a plurality of schemes for social coordination and that some choice will need to be made. The passage
continued, "[U] ntil a particular choice is made, nothing will in fact be
done. Morever, in some forms of human community, that something
be done is not just a matter of optional advantage, but is a matter of
right, a requirement ofjustice." 26 For example, Finnis says, there has
to be a social decision among alternative ways "of reconciling aspects
of justice with each other, and of reconciling human rights with each
27
other."
To illustrate this, let us explore an example about justice, analogous in form to the case of civil defense preparedness which we considered earlier. Any society has to face the issue of what to do about
economic misfortune that for certain families or individuals results in
desperate poverty. But any societal response has to reconcile competing demands that may be made in the name ofjustice and relate them
also to broader considerations of the common good: there are the
sheer claims of need, considerations of desert, justice-based concerns
about the acceptable range and patterns of economic inequality, issues about the fair distribution of opportunity as between the innocent children of the poor and the innocent children of the rich,
property-based claims which the better-off might raise as objections to
redistributive taxation, and concerns about incentives and efficiency
28
in the community at large.
In a given community, some intelligent members might propose
a scheme of social welfare and market organization to meet what they
regard as the complex demands ofjustice. Their scheme, J1, involves
relatively limited welfare payments to those in poverty, but this limited
cash support is offered against the background of a nationalized
health system, free education of high quality to tertiary level, and a
tightly regulated housing market. Others in the community propose
an alternative scheme, J2, which administers rather more generous
cash payments to those in desperate poverty, but which allows public
schools to fall into disrepute, does not offer anything other than bareminimum socialized medicine, and permits landlords to charge what
they like for housing.
25
26
27

See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
FINNIS, supra note 1, at 232.
Id.

28 For a helpful discussion, see id. at 192.
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The proponents of , and J2 may agree that it is important, from
the point of view ofjustice, that one or the other scheme be put into
effect (or some -further alternative addressing the same problems).
They may agree that the lack of any organized scheme of this sort
would be a disaster from the point of view of justice. But of course,
they disagree on the merits. J, and J2 are not playful alternatives.
While acknowledging that the matter is complex, the proponents of
each believe that the other falls seriously short of what justice requires. And though each acknowledges that the other alternative is
better, from the point of view ofjustice, than nothing at all, they are
inclined, nevertheless, to condemn the opposing proposal as unjust.
(And for all that I have said, one or the other of them may be right
about that.) Their evaluations of the respective proposals may be expressed in the following (I hope, by now, familiar) form:
Column-Chooser
J,
J2
1

Row-Chooser

J

1

12
4,3

2

J2

F G RE

3, 4
,4
2,1

5

The matrix in Figure 5 is the same as that in Figure 2, except that J,
and J2 replace C1 and C2. The numbers represent, respectively, RowChooser's and Column-Chooser's ordinal rankings of each outcome
29
from the point of view of justice.
For completeness, we should add a couple more matrices, which
are the justice/law versions of the matrices in Figures 1 and 3,
respectively:

29 It is important, for the points that I am making, to emphasize the ordinal nature of these rankings. Row-Chooser ranks outcome (J', JI) first, outcome (J2, J2)
second, and outcome (J, J2) third; but what the numbers 1, 2, and 3 do not convey is
how much better, from the point of view ofjustice, Row-Chooser may regard the first
outcome than the second. The first may beat the second narrowly, or the second may
be very considerably worse than the first, from the point of view ofjustice. All that is
important, for the points I am making, is that, whatever the discrepancy between the
two outcomes, both parties rank both coordinative outcomes as better, from the point
of view ofjustice, than a failure to coordinate.
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Column-Chooser
J1
Jl
Row-Chooser

Column-Chooser

J2

J,

2, 2J
1,

1, 3

3

4,2

2,1I

Row-Chooser

J2

2,2

IIJ2

FIGuRE

1

J2

6

The left-hand matrix in Figure 6 presents a case where there are two
alternative schemes ofjustice, and the parties believe there is nothing
to choose between them. As in the rules of the road case, they think
thatjustice is indifferent as between them, though, of course, justice is
not indifferent as to whether a choice is actually made between them
or not. In the right-hand matrix, however, the parties are so divided
on the merits of the rival schemes that one of them, Column-Chooser,
regards coordination on the first alternative, J1, as worse, from the
point of view of justice and the common good, than no coordination
at all, whereas Row-Chooser regards J as the most eligible option.3 0
What I am concerned to deny is that the authority of law makes its
central claims only in situations like the left-hand matrix in Figure 6,
where there is really nothing to choose (from the point of view of
justice) between the alternatives, J and J 2, proposed in a society.
As I said, in the body of NaturalLaw and NaturalRights there are
indications that Finnis denies this also-that he, too, believes that solving a problem like that set out in Figure 5 is central, not marginal, to
the concept of legal authority. For example, in a couple of places, he
addresses the possibility of a justice-related problem to which "various
reasonable solutions may be proposed and debated and should be setfled by some decision-making procedure which is authoritative." 3 He
does so with regard to the specification, demarcation, and balancing
of human rights3 2 and with regard to the criteria of distributive jus30 Don't forget that the rankings are ordinal for each person. They are not interpersonally comparable. There is no sense whatever in which Row-Chooser's ranking 4
is worse than Column-Chooser's 3.
31 FiNNis, supra note 1, at 220.
32 See id. at 218-21.

[W] e can say that people (or legal systems) who share substantially the same
concept (e.g., of the human right to life, or to a fair trial) may none the less
have different conceptions of that right, in that their specifications ... differ,
partly because the circumstances they have in mind differ and partly because
specification normally involves choices, by some authoritative process, from
among alternatives that are more or less equally reasonable.
Id. at 219. See also infra note 36 and accompanying text.
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tice. 33 In the latter instance, he talks of reasonable criteria for distributive justice failing to "yield any one pattern of distribution (or even
any determinable set of patterns) on which all reasonable men would
be bound to agree,"34 while in the former case he notices that it is not
the task of law or authority to bring on-going discussion to an end.
These formulations, especially the second, suggest that it is possible to adjudge both J, and J 2 "reasonable" even while debate continues to rage as to their relative merits. And that must mean that a
solution-say Ji-may be regarded by both sides as reasonable, even
though Column-Chooser thinks that a reasonable argument can be
made that it is inferior on grounds of justice.
IX.
If this is accepted, then perhaps we ought to start thinking about
two meanings of "lex iniusta- (i) a meaning defined in terms of the
matrix in Figure 5 (for in that case there is a sense in which ColumnChooser regards J as lex iniusta relative to J2 ) and (ii) a meaning defined in terms of the right-hand matrix in Figure 6 (where at least one
party regards one of the options as worse than no coordination at all
on an issue of justice).
Sense (ii) of lex iniustaclearly satisfies the claims by Finnis set out
at the beginning of this Essay. Someone who thinks a given law is so
unjust that we would be better off, from the point of view of justice,
leaving each other to pursue our own best individual views on the
issue which it addresses, cannot possibly think of the positing of such a
law as a central case of law-making. But sense (i) of lex iniusta arguably does not satisfy these claims. Indeed, I think I can show it is a
mistake to insist that a lex iniustain sense (i) cannot be a central case
of law. The argument to this effect is delicate. It goes as follows:
The work that legal authority has to do, on Finnis's general conception, is to facilitate conscious coordination in situations where coordination is practically necessary in pursuit of the common good.
The reference to conscious coordination is important. Neither authority, nor legal validity, can do their work silently--that is, irrespective of
what people think about the work they are doing. To vary the metaphor slightly, law is not like an invisible hand. It cannot do its work
unless people are aware of its doing its work (or, frankly, unless they
are doing its work for it). Law certainly cannot do its work of coordination if some, among those whose pursuit of the good is to be coordinated, do not believe that law is making a proper contribution to the
33 See Fn'mas, supra note 1, at 192.
34 Id.
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solution of a coordination problem. These points are not highlighted
in Finnis's account, but I think they follow pretty obviously from his
conception of the "rule of law."3 5 Certainly, we should want to insist,
on Finnis's behalf, that cases in which the community is divided, as to
whether law is acting appropriately or helpfully or not (so far as coordination is concerned), cannot be central cases of law. A standard of
legal validity (and the account of what law is doing, which backs up
that standard) must be a sharedstandard of validity. That means that a
central case of legal authority or legal validity cannot be a case in
which the parties disagree about its centrality. Because of the commonality or shared-ness central to law, a case which is such that the
parties disagree about its centrality must be less central than a case in
which they do not.
Now clearly, the parties will agree about law's contribution to the
pure coordination problem in the left-hand matrix in Figure 6 (assuming law solves the problem). There is nothing in the merits of the
case or in the parties' respective opinions about the merits that could
possibly generate any disagreement. However, as we have already
seen, these are trivial cases, and it would be odd if there were no other
cases than these in the core of the concept law. The problem is that
the non-trivial cases are like those in Figure 5, where the parties disagree about the justice-related merits of J and J2 . If legal resolutions
of such cases are to figure (as central cases) in the core of the concept
law, it must be possible to drive a wedge between the issue about the
merits of the options and the issue about whether this is a central case
of legal authority. It must be possible to insulate the latter issue from
disagreements about the former. Or else, allsuch cases will have to be
categorized as non-central.
Thus, suppose Column-Chooser were to say that the positing of J,
was not a central case of law or legal authority, because it involved the
choice of an option which was worse from the point of view ofjustice.
Row-Chooser would, of course, deny this and would maintain that the
positing of J, was a central case of law because J, was the more just
alternative. So the parties over whom the putative authority was being
exercised would disagree about whether it was a central or a marginal
case of authority, and accordingly, their response to its claims would
be somewhat different. The continuation of their debate over justice-which, as we saw, Finnis envisages 36-would constitute an ex post
facto debate about the validity of the law. But surely, law and authority
cannot operate in this way. Surely, in cases where a social choice is
35
36

See id. at 266-81.
See id. at 220.
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made between two, reasonable, rival proposals, people ought to be
able to agree on the issue of legality or legal validity ("Which proposal
is now identifiable as the legally valid choice?") even while they disagree on the merits of the proposals. Indeed, it is hard to see what
positive law could add to a situation like this, if it could not yield identical judgments about legal validity in this circumstance. If one of the
parties thought J was lex iniusta in sense (ii), while the other party
denied this, then certainly we would be dealing with a problematic
case, because the parties would be disagreeing, in effect, about
whether the legal imposition of J, could contribute to the solution of
the sort of coordination problem which, on Finnis's account, it is exactly law's mission to address. This could not possibly be regarded as a
central case of law, not even by the party who regarded J as just. Why
not? Because law cannot be thought to be doing the work that it
ought to do, if all know that at least one of the parties concerned,
such as the supporter of J2, believes, not unreasonably, that it is not
doing that work. If, however, it is evident to all (and agreed by all)
that the positing of Jfcan solve the coordination problem, then the
fact that one or the other party thinks some alternative solution would
be even better does not alter the fact that the chosen solution can be
recognized as such (I mean, recognized as chosen) by both of them.
X.
Against the claims I am making about the natural lawyers' view of
these matters, someone might say,
Of course a natural law theory, like Finnis's theory, is going to get
into the tangles you have indicated. That is because natural lawyers
do not take positive law seriously. Unlike Hobbes, Bentham, Austin,
Hart, and Raz, they do not see the advantage of having a concept of
legal validity relatively insulated from the moral assessment of the
norms to which it applies. The argument in the last part insists that
law, authority, and validity cannot do their work unless people can
agree about when they are doing their work. That is a positivist view,
for it requires people to disengage their faculty of making judgements about morality and justice when they are answering questions
of law, authority, and validity.
But this will not do, certainly not as a claim about Finnis (nor, if Finnis
is right, as a claim about such other paradigmatic natural lawyers as
Aquinas). For Finnis's theory of natural law does purport to take positive law seriously. It maintains that there are problems in human life
that only positive law (with its authority and its standards of validity)
can solve, and it provides an elaborate account of the relation be-
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tween the concepts and mechanisms of positive law-including valid37
ity-and the concepts and mechanisms of natural law.
What I was arguing in Part IX of this paper was not that Finnis
will be unable to give a positivist account of law, if he sticks with his
thesis that no unjust law can be a central case of law. I was arguing
that he will not be able to give a coherent account of the work allocated to positive law by his own naturallaw theory, if he sticks with that
thesis.
As we have seen, the work allocated to positive law in Finnis's own
natural law theory does not require a notion of positive validity that is
entirely insulated from moral judgment. Positive validity, as a legal
notion, does its work in situations where practical reasonableness requires coordination among the members of a society. That is, it does
its work in circumstances where it is better, from the point of view of
practical reason, that people act in a coordinated way than that each
try to figure out for himself what practical reasonableness requires of
him. Now, that will not be true of every case in which people might
coordinate. People might coordinate in a way that made things worse,
not better, than the situation in which each tries to figure things out
for himself. Any notion of positive validity oriented towards coordination in cases of that kind would be of negative interest to the theorist
of natural law. (On a positivist view, by contrast, such a notion would
be of no less interest, jurisprudentially, than any other.) So positive
validity, on the natural law account, does have a moral dimension.
But I am arguing that that moral dimension must leave room for
cases in which people disagree about which of two coordinative
schemes would be better, from the point of view of justice, even
though they agree-and rightly--that either would be better, from
the point of view of justice, than no coordination at all. In that circumstance-which of course is specified morally (but not specified, so
to speak, as a matter of maximizing morality)-the notion of legal
validity should be oriented unequivocally to the part of the moral
equation that has to do with the superiority of coordination over noncoordination, not to the part of the moral equation that has to do with
the superiority of one of the coordinative schemes over the other.
Without that unequivocal orientation, legal validity would do its work
differently in the eyes of different participants, which is to say that it
would fail altogether to do the only work allocated to it in a theory of
this kind-that is, the work of supporting and facilitating coordination where coordination is morally important.
37 See, for example, the account of the emergence of custom (a form of positive
law) in FINNIs, supra note 1, at 238-45.
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XI.
Near the beginning of this Essay (in Part II), I appealed to an
analogy between the circumstances ofjustice and the circumstances in
which law makes its claims upon us. This is an analogy I have used in
several places in my recent work,38 and I would like to say a little more
about its implications here.
I suggested that we should regard disagreement aboutjustice and
the common good not as an unusual situation for legal authority to
have to deal with, but as the paradigm situation in which it does its
central and characteristic work. The analogy was with scarcity and distributivejustice. The situation in which goods are moderately scarce,
so that not everyone can get all he wants, is not anomalous or unusual,
so far as the application of rules ofjustice are concerned. Rather, this
is one of the circumstances which make justice a necessary virtue.3 9 If
you like, it is one of the presuppositions of justice. 4° We may say,
along similar lines, that the existence of disagreement aboutjustice or
the common good, together with the need for a single decision, is a
presupposition of legal authority.
I think of this as a rather obvious point, but it has not been given
great prominence in recent discussions of authority. It is obvious
enough that authority presupposes a choice among courses of action.
This is assumed, I take it, by all theories which analyze authority in
terms of reasons for action. 4 1 And Finnis makes this quite clear, too,
when he acknowledges, as background to his discussion of authority,
the fact that human intelligence characteristically gives the members
of any community "more possible orientations, commitments,
projects, 'priorities,' and procedures to choose from" than they can
possibly adopt, necessitating some sort of choice among this plethora
of alternatives. 4 2 What is not emphasized enough-and what I have
tried to emphasize here-is that authority presupposes not only that
we are confronted by alternative courses of action, among which some
choice is necessary, but also that we are confronted by alternative
38 SeeJeremy Waldron, The Circumstances ofIntegrity, 3 LEGAL THEORY 1 (1997); see
also JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGEEMENT 102, 105-17, 159-60, 189, 207-08
(1999).
39 See JoHN RAWLs, A THEORY OFJUSnCE 126-30 (1971); see also DAvID HUME, A
TREATISE OF HUMAN NAruRE 493-96 (L.A. Selby-Bigge & P. H. Nidditch eds., 2d ed.
1978).
40 For articles that discuss "presupposition" in Strawson's sense, see P.F. Strawson,
On Referring, 59 MmND 320 (1950), and P.F. Strawson, A Reply to Mr. Sellars, 63 PHIL.
REv. 216 (1954).
41 See, e.g., JOSEPH RAz, THE MORAMrrY OF FREEDOM 38-105 (1986).
42 FINNis, supra note 1, at 232.
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courses of action, concerning whose merits those who have to settle
on a course of action disagree. The position of an authority is not
characteristically that of a tie-breaker, one who settles on a single
course of action from a range of alternatives among which everyone is
indifferent. On the contrary, the position of an authority characteristically is that of a person or institution whose decision must override
the considered opinions (concerning the merits of the alternatives) of
some of those over whom he is an authority. So, if he is an authority
on some matter of justice, his decision must override the considered
opinion of some of those subject to his authority concerning the justice of the various options among which a choice is required.
From this, a quite important result follows. It cannot ordinarily
count against an exercise, E, of authority that E has selected an unjust
outcome (say, J1). For the proposition "J, is unjust" to count against
E, it would have to be held by one of those over whom the authority in
E was exercised. But it is characteristic of authority, I have argued,
that it has to settle on a course of action for a community, some of
whose members believe the proposition ", is unjust" and some of
whose members deny it. That a given member of the community believes that J is unjust is not a ground for impugning authority; it is
one of the circumstances that elicit it.
A similar argument can be developed along lines suggested by
Joseph Raz (if I may be permitted to adapt his argument to my terminology). Raz argues that E cannot be authoritative unless there is a
way of identifying E as an exercise of authority which does not involve
ascertaining whether "J is unjust" is true. 48 By the same token, E cannot be authoritative to any particularextent (for example, a central case
of authority, or a less-than-central, or a marginal, case of authority)
unless there is a way of showing that it is authoritative to that extent
which does not involve ascertaining whether "J is unjust" is true. This
is my basis, then, for denying what I said in Part III was Finnis's position, that the choice of an unjust alternative detracts from the centrality of the exercise of authority which involves the making of that
choice. I want to say that, in the circumstances of authority, an unjust
law may be no less a law, even in the central and focal sense of "law"
that we identified in Part I, than a law whose justice is unimpugnable.

43 SeeJoseph Raz, Authority, Law, and Morality, in ETHics IN THE PUBLIC DoMAIN:
ESSAYS IN THE MORALr= OF LAW AND PoLmcs 219 (1994) ("[Tlhe subjects of any

authority... can benefit by its decisions only if they can establish their existence and
content in ways which do not depend on raising the very same issues which the authority is there to settle.").
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It does not follow, of course, that "lex iniusta non est le? has no
work to do. If J is so unjust that things would be better, from the
point of view ofjustice, if the members of the community in question
did not coordinate their activity in this regard at all, then the choice
of J, cannot be a central case of authority, nor can a law embodying J,
be a central instance of law. This is what I argued in Part VIII, with
reference to the right-hand matrix in Figure 6. Butfi may be less just
than some alternative, although its adoption by a community may be
better, from the viewpoint of justice, than non-coordination. In this
case-where J, though unjust, is nevertheless just enough (lex satis
iusta)-the centrality of E as an exercise of authority and a basis of law
is insulated from any verdict about justice on the merits.
XII.
I have tried to develop this case within the broad structure of
Finnis's approach to jurisprudence. Nevertheless, Finnis is unlikely to
accept my conclusion-that a law may be judged less than just but still
consistently be regarded as law in the fullest sense. But I do not think
the source of our disagreement has much to do with the logic of the
argument in the preceding parts. I think Finnis might well accept
that, if there were such a thing as reasonable disagreement aboutjustice, then we would have to distinguish two senses of lex iniusta,along
the lines I indicated in Part IX, and deal with them as I have suggested. In his recent work, however, he has committed himself quite
firmly to the view that there cannot be reasonable disagreement about
justice, at least not about its fundamentals.4
This view has been developed by Finnis in response to a suggestion by John Rawls about issues, like abortion, which seem to involve
disputes about deep ethical or theological views. Rawls suggests that
there are some propositions-such as the proposition that first-trimester foetuses are human beings with souls-about which "reasonable
persons are bound to differ uncompromisingly."45 Rawls argues, in
PoliticalLiberalism, that such disputable propositions may not be cited
in the public justification of any law or constitutional principle, and
that, therefore, any law or constitutional principle which is indefensible apart from such propositions must be rejected. Finnis's response
44 See infra notes 47-51 and accompanying text.
45 JoHN RAWLs, PomTcAL LIBERALISM 138 (1993), cited inJohn Finnis, Seegers Lecture: Public Reason, Abortion, and Cloning, 32 VAL. U. L. REv. 361, 364-65 (1998). For
Rawls's application of this to abortion, see id. at 243 n.32. For a subsequent repudiation of that footnote, see JoHN RAwLs, PoLmcAL LIBERALiSM, wrrH
TION AND THE "REPLY TO HABERMAS," at lv n.31 (1996).

A NEW INTRODUC-
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is to ask (though these are not exactly his words), "in what sense of
'bound' are people bound to disagree about issues like abortion? Is
this just a matter of prediction? Or is Rawls suggesting that the disagreement itself is reasonable, in the sense that reason actually underwrites the disagreement or underwrites both of the contestant
positions?" 46 Of course, Finnis is as well acquainted as anyone with
actually existing disagreement about these issues as a matter of sociological fact. But he identifies himself with the tradition of ethical rationalism, which insists that reason can, in principle, reach a singular
truth on matters like these, if it is used and followed expertly and
conscientiously. With regard to the disputant positions about abortion that I mentioned-"first-trimester foetuses are human beings
with souls" and "first-trimester foetuses are not human beings with
souls"-Finnis denies that both of them can represent the conclusions
of reason. He insists that anyone committed to reason must also be
committed to the view that, at most, only one of these positions may
be described as reasonable. 47 Accordingly, he says, we cannot even say
that the disagreementbetween the two positions is reasonable, since we
all agree that at least one of the positions is unreasonable (even if we
disagree about which one).48

Finnis is working here with very strong senses of "reasonable" and
"unreasonable." He treats them as terms which take their meaning, if
you will, from the telos of reason-namely, truth. Ultimately the telos
of reason in any domain, on any matter, is to attain the truth about
the matter, and moreover, to obtain it in a way that is not arbitrary or
accidental, but by a method which, given the way the world is, could
only have led to that result. So, on Finnis's account, an unreasonable
view is one to which (it will turn out) reason could not have led us. Of
course, we may not know in advance of consummate, rational inquiry
which proposition is true and which is not. But this deficit in our
knowledge is not itself a ground for regarding both propositions as
reasonable, any more than it is a ground for saying that they are both,
for the time being, true.
Finnis also maintains that a reasonable person who affirms a proposition affirms, in effect, that all other reasonable people will agree
with him. That is, reasonable affirmers must believe that at least
under "favourable conditions of investigation" 49 and reflection, "rea46
47
48
49
ACAD.

See Finnis, supra note 45, at 365.
See id. at 364-65 n.19.
See id.-at 365.
See David Wiggins, Truth, Invention, and the Meaning of Life 62 PRoc. Bprr.
331 (1976). Finnis attributes this phrase to David Wiggins. SeeJoHN FnNIs,
FUNDAMENTALS OF ETHICS 64 (1983).
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sonable people would agree with their affirmation." 50 This, together
with the unity of truth, quickly disposes of any idea that a reasonable
affirmer could recognize the reasonableness of his opponent's denial,
according to Finnis, unless, perhaps, they are "mere propagandists
willing to use any and every rhetorical device to win non-rational endorsements of the theses for which they are 'arguing."'51
Rawls approaches the meaning of "reasonable" and "unreasonable" in a quite different way. 52 For him, a view is reasonable (at a
given time) if it is capable of representing (at that time) the upshot of
a conscientious use of human intellect. 53 As Rawls observes in a foot-

note, "In a particular case someone may, of course, affirm a reasonable doctrine in an unreasonable way, for example, blindly or
capriciously. That does not make the doctrine as such unreasonable."5- 4 Rawls believes that in the circumstances of human life, mutu-

ally inconsistent views, especially about deep matters of philosophy,
ethics, and religion, will often both be reasonable in that sense. He
speaks of these circumstances as "the burdens of judgement," by
which he means "the many hazards involved in the correct (and conscientious) exercise of our powers of reason and judgment in the ordinary course of political life"5 5 which stand in the way of any
expectation of agreement among reasonable persons.5 6 Many of our
most important judgments, Rawls says, are made about matters and
50 Finnis, supra note 45, at 365 n.21.
51 Id.
52 Let me say that I accept immediately Finnis's suggestion that Rawls's use of
'reasonable" and "public reason" is confused. Id. at 363; see also Jeremy Waldron,
Justice Revisited, Timr-s LrrERARY SuPPLErmrr,June 18, 1993, at 5-6 (distinguishing between (i)"reasonable" in the sense of willing to come to terms with others in good
faith and (ii) reasonable in the sense of possibly being the upshot of a conscientious
and unbiased application of epistemic capabilities). Rawls fails to see that (i) and (ii)
may come apart. The discussion in the text refers only to (ii).
53 See RAxwLs, supranote 45, at 48-66. Two points about this definition are worth
noting: (1) The time indices indicate that, in Rawls's sense, one and the same proposition can be reasonable at one time, but unreasonable at a later time (for example,
in light of a well known, intervening discovery). This relativity to time is not appropriate for Finnis's use of "reasonable," though it may be appropriate for the predicate
'conscientiously and on good grounds believed to be reasonable (in Finnis's sense)."
See Finnis, supranote 45, at 369-70. (2) In sense (ii) of supra note 52 above, "reasonable" is applied to propositions not persons. A proposition is reasonable (at a time) if
there is something about it (and the circumstances of the time) that make it a candidate for a conscientious and competent exercise of human intellectual powers (at that
time).
54 Id. at 60 n.14.
55 Id. at 54-56.
56 See id. at 54-58.
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under conditions "where it is not to be expected that conscientious
persons with full powers of reason, even after free discussion, will arrive at the same conclusion. '57 On any plausible account, human life
engages multiple values, and it is natural that people will disagree
about how to balance or prioritize them. Also, on any plausible account, people's respective positions, perspectives, and experiences in
life will give them different bases from which to make these delicate
judgments. These differences of experience and position combine
with the evident complexity of the issues being addressed, resulting in
disagreement among reasonable persons not only about what the
world is like, but also about the relevance and weight to be accorded
the various facts and insights that they have at their disposal. Together, factors like these make good faith disagreement not only predictable, but inevitable: "Different conceptions of the world can
reasonably be elaborated from different standpoints and diversity
arises in part from our distinct perspectives. It is unrealistic .

.

. to

suppose that all our differences are rooted solely in ignorance and
perversity, or else in the rivalries for power, status, or economic
gain." 58 Rawls does not think this commits him to denying that, at
most, only one of two such mutually inconsistent propositions (such as
our pair of propositions about first-trimester foetuses) can be true.
And he concedes, of course, that one who affirms a reasonable posi59
tion usually affirms it as true.
Unlike Finnis, however, Rawls does not believe that truth directly
spawns a notion of reasonableness that is helpful for politics, nor does
he believe that the affirmation of truth indicates a commitment to a
notion of reasonableness tied tightly to truth in this way. In response
to the Rawlsian idea of the burdens of judgment, Finnis offers the
following:
There are many reasonable differences which arise from differences
of sentiment, of prior commitment, and of belief about likely future
outcomes. In such cases, there is no uniquely correct opinion,
though there are many incorrect opinions. But in relation to some
matters, including at least some matters of basic rights, there are
correct moral beliefs, accessible to all (even to those who in fact
reject them). In relation to such matters, differing opinions can
only be rooted in ignorance or some sub-rational influence, and it is
mistaken-though this of course needs to be shown, by rational argument-to say that there is more than one "fully reasonable" or
"perfectly reasonable" belief. If by "perfectly reasonable" though er57
58
59

Id. at 58.
Id.
Id. at 61.
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roneous belief Rawls means a belief which is held without subjective
moral fault in respect of the forming of it, I would say that that is an
important category of defacto beliefs but one which would better be
called, not "perfectly reasonable"-which it quite clearly is not!but "inculpably erroneous," blamelessly mistaken or, in one traditional idiom, "invincibly ignorant.' Public reasoning should be directed to overcoming the relevant mistakes, and public
them in practice-not
deliberations should be directed to avoiding
60
pre-emptively surrendering to them.
Now, this position is stated carefully enough to leave a number of options open. Finnis acknowledges, first, that there are some matters on
which there is no uniquely true or correct position. On such matters,
it is possible that two or more positions may be reasonable, even
though they are, in some sense, opposed to one another. Second, he
of course accepts that someone may be blamelessly mistaken about a
matter on which there is a right answer. For this case, all that Finnis
denies is that the concept of "reasonableness" should go with the
"blamelessness," rather than with the truth. And his argument for
that is that, even when we are blamelessly mistaken, we still want a
concept of reasonableness that is oriented towards the avoidance of
such errors and the improvement of our intellect rather than a concept which surrenders to such vicissitudes purely on account of their
innocence.
Third-and this is the least clear point-Finnis appears to leave
open the possibility that, regarding some matters of basic rights (and,
I assume, it follows from that, some matters of justice), there is no
uniquely correct view (for what he says is that "in relation to some
matters, including at least some matters of basic rights, there are correct moral beliefs").61 The acknowledgment of that possibility is congruent with what we saw earlier (in Part VIII above) 62 was the position
in Natural Law and Natural Rights concerning the detailed specification of certain arrays of rights:
[W] e can say that people (or legal systems) who share substantially
the same concept (e.g. of the human right to life, or to a fair trial)
may none the less have different conceptions of that right, in that
their specifications... differ, partly because the circumstances they
have in mind differ and partly because specification normally involves choices, by some authoritative process, from among alterna63
tives that are more or less equally reasonable.
60 Finnis, supra note 45, at 369-70 (footnotes omitted).
61 Id. at 370 (emphasis added).
62 See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
63 Fnms, supra note 1, at 219.
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Let's call these differences "S-differences" ("S" for "specification of
rights"). I think it follows, from all that has been reported over the
past couple of pages, that Finnis believes that, so far as these S-differences are concerned, there is no truth of the matter, just reasonable
alternatives.
What I find interesting and attractive about this position is that
Finnis refuses to associate reason's inability to specify a uniquely correct resolution of an S-difference with any Rawlsian-style exclusion of
S-differences from the public realm. S-differences do have to be resolved; the legal system cannot do without their resolution. Since reason cannot resolve them, they must be resolved authoritatively by law,
according to Finnis. 64 And what I have been arguing, throughout this
Essay, is that something like the resolution of S-differences is no less
central a case of legal authority than a case on which reason does
promise and yield a uniquely right answer.
With regard to this class of cases, the only outstanding difference
between us (as far as I can see) is that Finnis may believe it is inappropriate for a participant in an S-difference to maintain that his specification (of some right) is better or more just than that of his
opponent. I am not sure whether Finnis thinks this or not. (It would
certainly be a mistake to think that this followed from his earlier insistence on the point that anyone who thinks there is a truth of the issue
must think that his opponent is unreasonable.) Finnis might say that
any person, P, who thinks his specification, J2 , is better than another
citizen's specification, J1, must believe that there is reason to support
J2 rather than J1, and so, with that belief, P must take the issue out of
the range of "S-differences" as I have defined them. But this would
have the silly consequence we noted earlier that S-differences would
turn out not to be differences that people took seriously or that they
would turn out to be differences on which people thought they just
"happened" to differ. And I do not think that is consonant with the
tenor of Finnis's analysis in the relevant chapters of NaturalLaw and
NaturalRights.
Assuming S-differences may be both reasonable and serious,
there is one final issue, on which I find myself lining up firmly with
Finnis against Rawls. According to Rawls, the likelihood of an issue's
64 See id. at 220.
[T] he resolution of all these problems of human rights is a process in which
various reasonable solutions may be proposed and debated and should be
settled by some decision-making procedure which is authoritative but which
does not pretend to be infallible or to silence further rational discussion or
to forbid the reconsideration of the decision.
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being contested-and of two contradictory views of it being held in
the community, reasonably (by Rawls's lights)-is a sign that such issue is appropriately excluded from the public realm and taken off the
agenda ofjustice. 6 5 Only those matters should be raised as matters of
justice on which reasonable disagreement-of the sort explicated in
Rawls's idea of the burdens ofjudgment-is not to be expected. Using our earlier example, the question of whether a first-trimester foetus is a human being with a soul may not be presented as an issue of
justice, according to Rawls, because it is a question on which reasonable people are bound to differ (using Rawls's definition of "reasonable"). As I understand it, Finnis will have no truck with that approach,
and I think he is right in that. The fact that reasonable disagreement
is anticipated (even in Rawls's sense of "reasonable") is not a ground
for excluding an issue from the public agenda.6 6 It cannot be, because everyone knows that all serious issues ofjustice and rights are reasonably contested, in that sense of reasonable. True, Raws uses the burdens of
judgment to explain only what he calls comprehensive philosophical
disagreements. 67 But, evidently, the same idea can be used to characterize our political deliberations, including our deliberations about
rights and justice, as well as ethics, religion, and so forth. The circumstances under which people make judgments about issues like affirmative action, the legalization of abortion, criminal process, the limits of
free speech, the limits of the market, the proper extent of welfare
provision, and the role of personal desert in economic justice are exactly those in which we would expect, given Rawls's account of the
burdens ofjudgment, that reasonable persons would differ. As in the
case of more comprehensive disagreements, we do not need to invoke
bad faith, ignorance, or self-interest as an explanation. The difficulty
of the issues-and the multiplicity of intelligences and diversity of perspectives brought to bear on them-are sufficient to explain why reasonable people disagree. 68 Disagreement about justice-like
disagreement about almost everything else-is (as I said in Part IX)
one of the circumstances of politics. Finnis deplores this, of course.
He says,
65 See RAwLs, supra note 45, at 243.
66 Of course, Finnis rejects Rawls's sense of "reasonable," but that does not mean
he finds the alleged definiens unintelligible. So (using that definiens rather than the
contested term itself), Finnis believes that the fact that conscientious and intelligent
uses of human intellect would come up with opposing positions on a matter is not, in
itself, a ground for excluding that matter from the public agenda.
67 See RAW.LS, supra note 45, at 58.
68 See WALDRoN, supra note 38, at 112, 151-53. See generallyjeremyWaldron, Disagreements AboutJustice, 75 PAc. Pmn. Q. 372 (1994).
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To the extent that there is lack of agreement on basic issues, to that
extent there is an obstacle to genuine community. This obstacle is
in itself a great harm for a society, and so "pluralism" of opinion on
matters basic to the common good is a deficiency, an evil, some69
thing to be regretted-not something to be held up as a standard.
In the end, it is perhaps this that explains Finnis's reluctance to see
the resolution of disagreements aboutjustice by legal or political means
as a central case of authority. But at least he does not think, as Rawls
does, that the prospect of disagreement-reasonable or not,
deplorable or not-is in principle incompatible with the exercise of
public reason.

69 John Finnis, Unjust Laws in a Democratic Society: Some Philosophicaland Theological
Reflections, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 595, 596 (1996).

